While a great deal of speculative or anecdotal work has been published in recent years on the Taliban’s military objectives and structure, there is little substantive research on their views of humanitarian and development issues. Understanding the history of humanitarian engagement with the Taliban, many of whom are increasingly positioning themselves as a ‘government in waiting’, as well as prospects for future engagement, will be critical to those seeking to understand the future of humanitarian and development work in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.
This research does not aim to provide a full account of humanitarian access negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Rather, through a series of structured interviews, background discussions and desk research, it seeks to provide greater insight into the opportunities and obstacles aid agencies face in working in areas of Afghanistan where the Taliban have gained significant control or influence. The report begins with an overview of aid agency access in Afghanistan since 2001, obstacles to engagement with the Taliban and various access strategies. It then examines the perspectives of the Taliban leadership and its policy on aid agency engagement. Two case studies, in Kandahar and Faryab provinces, seek to examine these issues at a local level. The report concludes with recommendations aimed at improving agency access through dialogue with the Taliban.