John Mitchell reflects on the outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.
At the first face-to-face meeting of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) thematic teams in 2014, a thematic team member posed the following questions: ‘Who was this Summit for? What was the change it was trying to achieve?’ The answers from the World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat were: ‘Everyone’ and ‘Everything we possibly can.’
In the absence of an inter-governmental process, this Summit process opted for inclusiveness and participation over formal negotiations and binding agreements. As a result, several hundred commitments have been produced, but the security of a formal framework - like Sendai – has not.
"...the Summit has unwittingly created an unmanageable load."
A friend remarked to me on the way back from Istanbul that the Summit has unwittingly created an unmanageable load. He said it would have been better to have three big things to work on, all of which can bring about optimum change and improvement. Instead, he lamented, we have over-produced and created commitment gridlock.
So, how do we make sure we get the traffic flowing and harness all the good ideas and intentions to establish something really worth having? Looking at what we already have on the table, at first glance it seems as though there are three types of issues, all with different levels of potential to bring about positive change.
The first type of issues, which have a strong potential to bring about improvements, are in the fast lane for change. For example, cash and localisation were considered the top ‘winners’ of the Summit, but had already been gaining momentum prior to, and outside of, the Summit process. Significant changes around cash-based programming and greater powers for local/frontline organisations have been laid out, and there is a high level of expectation that both of these will bring about significant changes in humanitarian action.
The second type of issues have been around for a long time, but have been re-generated by the Summit and consequently put more firmly into the consciousness of humanitarian leaders and practitioners.
Urbanisation, youth movements, disabilities and gender were all largely ignored by the initial World Humanitarian Summit consultations, reflecting their broader marginalisation within the sector. Yet they ended up with top billing at the Summit due to effective and focused advocacy efforts.
These issues tend to be linked to broader social movements, rely on a diversity of actors and other social processes, and have potential bring about gradual change in the medium to long term. They are in the middle lane for change.
The third type of issues are those which are often referred to as intractable, deeply-rooted in the system, and political in nature, for example compliance with international humanitarian law, refugee rights, humanitarian financing mechanisms, and UN mandate inefficiencies.
These are exactly the kind of issues that need an inter-governmental Summit, as they require invested leadership from the UN and a facilitated negotiation process in order to achieve real change. Not surprisingly therefore this is where the Summit was seen to offer the greatest disappointments.
As it lacked formal negotiations and binding agreements, the Summit is unlikely to achieve the changes desired. Moreover, the changes required for these deeply-rooted issues are essentially political and outside the control of the humanitarian community. They represent one of the central dilemmas of humanitarian action; namely that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. In this sense these issues are at best in the slow lane for change, and some of them may already have broken down on the hard shoulder.
"The changes required for these deeply-rooted issues are essentially political and outside the control of the humanitarian community."
Disaggregating the issues and commitments is only the first part of getting the traffic flowing. We also need to understand the different theories of change that underpin the different issues and commitments. Only then can we begin to set realistic expectations about what is achievable, and work out sensible and realistic ways of monitoring and supporting the changes we want to see.