References

For example, reports from Mozambique highlight the in-country confusion caused by the reversal of plans to transition out of a humanitarian footing, and the implications of the hyper-prioritisation of the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) against the backdrop of escalating needs (Worley, 2025a). Similarly, in Cameroon, reports suggest that the ‘accelerated transition’ to a development footing, sped up by aid cuts, has been marked by a lack of clarity and structured attention to gap-filling and risk management (Worley, 2025b).

Since late 2023, ALNAP has been talking with people across the humanitarian sector about the prioritisation challenges they face, including in our podcast series ‘A matter of priorities’. Building on this, in June 2025, we published a commentary piece that sets out a framework for considering prioritisation choices (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025). This paper expands on that piece.

See, inter alia, Saez et al (2021).

For example, the Afghanistan ‘reprioritised’ HNRP is one of only a few of these country plans which gives an account of its methodology in any detail. It notes that clusters reduced activities and targets by factoring in response gaps analysis from the first half of 2024 and anticipated future funding shortfalls. ‘Given the current context and funding climate, however, clusters were asked to further prioritize by i) focusing primarily on life-saving activities under SO1 and protection-related activities under SO2 and dropping activities with low reach in 2024; ii) reducing the proportion of people targeted in line with projected declines in resources available; iii) and considering no longer responding in provinces where partners have recalibrated or reduced their presence’ (OCHA, 2025b).

For example, for some donors, core funding to UN agencies is handled by their respective ministries of foreign affairs, while programmatic funding to UN agencies and others is handled by the development ministry or department. For several donors, overall funding ‘envelopes’ are decided at headquarters level, while programmatic allocation decisions are devolved to country level.

See, for example, Darcy and Hofmann (2003); Knox-Clarke and Darcy (2014); Obrecht (2017); de Geoffroy et al (2015); Swithern (2018).

For example, FEWSNET – for 40 years the primary framework and mechanism for prioritising humanitarian responses to food insecurity, which is the largest humanitarian sector – was an early casualty of the US aid freeze. Dan Maxwell of the Feinstein International Center has expressed the impacts of this on prioritisation and decision-making: ‘My fear is that [it] would mean that there is no evidence on which to base the choice of [how to] allocate more food assistance’ (Worley, 2025c).

For example, evidence from multiple countries shows how humanitarian agencies have bypassed national social protection systems (see Phelps and Chandaria, 2025), and localisation studies repeatedly highlight the lack of understanding about national and local informal responses and safety nets (see Barbelet et al, 2024).

Some attempts have been made to overcome this – most notably with the Dioptra tool, a multi-INGO initiative to create a web-based cost analysis tool to use existing financial and monitoring data to rapidly estimate cost-efficiency of programme interventions. See https://www.dioptratool.org/.

The US was unequivocal about its aid priorities being politically driven, noting that it would fund ‘disaster relief when it fulfils the President’s foreign policy aims’ (Kerwin, 2025); the European Union’s (EU) official development assistance (ODA) is being reprioritised away from service provision towards a greater emphasis on infrastructure – in line with principles of its global gateway programme, framed as promoting economic development for EU partners as well as ensuring EU member states’ private-sector investments and competitiveness (EC, n.d.).

For example, cost-effectiveness and responsible use of resources are articulated as a key aim by some, and this aim was included in previous iterations of this tool (see Obrecht and Swithern, 2025). But we do not include it here as this objective is regarded as a means to achieving ‘higher order’ humanitarian purposes – such as saving lives.

As noted in our commentary piece (ibid.), life-saving can mean: whom we are trying to target for assistance (i.e. those in most significant life threatening circumstances); the outcomes we are trying to achieve (i.e. reducing excess mortality rates in particular populations); the services we are willing to deliver (i.e. food security versus education); or the timeframe in which we will operate (i.e. 90 days opposed to 90 months).

For example, strategic documents published by some organisations offer localisation and community empowerment as a framing principle, but they go on to describe a pre-set sectoral menu.

See the principles chapter in ALNAP (2022).

The UN 80 Humanitarian Compact does not address the question of organisational configuration and resourcing for diplomacy, but it does emphasise the need to bring agencies together to speak with one voice under a new Collaborative Humanitarian Diplomacy Initiative (UN, 2025).